Abstract. One of the most widespread framework for the management of access-control policies is Administrative Role Based Access Control (ARBAC). Several automated analysis techniques have been proposed to help maintaining desirable security properties of ARBAC policies. One limitation of many available techniques is that the sets of users and roles are bounded. In this paper, we propose a symbolic framework to overcome this difficulty. We design an automated security analysis technique, parametric in the number of users and roles, by adapting recent methods for model checking infinite state systems that use first-order logic and state-of-the-art theorem proving techniques. Preliminary experiments with a prototype implementations seem to confirm the scalability of our technique.
Introduction
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [20] regulates access by assigning users to roles which, in turn, are granted permissions to perform certain operations. Administrative RBAC (ARBAC) [11] specifies how RBAC policies may be changed by administrators; thus providing support for decentralized policy administration, which is crucial in large distributed systems. For the sake of simplicity, we consider the URA97 component of ARBAC97 [19] , which is concerned with the management of the user-role assignment by administrative roles. The generalization to other variants of ARBAC is left to future work.
As it is almost impossible for a human to foresee the subtle interplays between the operations carried out by different administrators because of the large number of possible interleavings. Automated analysis techniques are thus of paramount importance to maintain desirable security properties while ensuring flexible administration. Several techniques have been proposed, e.g., [17, 23, 22] . In general, security analysis problems are undecidable but become decidable under suitable restrictions. Indeed, the results of the analysis are valid under the assumptions that make them decidable. In this respect, one of the most severe limitations of the available techniques is that the number of users and roles is bounded, i.e. finite and known a priori. So, if one has proved that a certain property holds for, say, 1000 users and 150 roles and after some times, the number of users or roles is changed for some reason, then the result of the previous analysis no more holds and the automated technique must be invoked again. It would be desirable to have analysis techniques capable of certifying that a certain property holds regardless of the number of users or roles so to make their results more useful.
In this paper, we propose a symbolic framework to specify ARBAC policies that enables the design of parametric (in the number of users and roles) security analysis techniques. The idea is to adapt recent techniques for model checking infinite state systems [14] that use decidable fragments of first-order logic and state-of-the-art theorem proving techniques to mechanize the analysis. The paper makes two contributions towards the goal of building parametric analysis techniques for ARBAC policies. The former is a framework for the uniform specification of a variety of ARBAC policies. In particular, we can describe security analysis problems where users and roles are finitely many but their exact number is not known a priori. The second contribution is a symbolic backward reachability procedure that can be used to solve an important class of security analysis problems, called user-role reachability problems, that allow one to check if certain users can acquire a given permission or, dually, if a user can never be given a role which would give him or her a permission which is not supposed to have. The security analysis problem is iteratively reduced to a series of satisfiability checks in a decidable fragment of first-order logic. We use ideas from model theory and the theory of well-quasi-ordering [14, 5] for the proof of termination of the method, which turns out to be the most substantial part of the proof of correctness. The decidability of the parametric goal reachability problem is obtained as a corollary of the correctness of the procedure.
Our decidability result is more general that those in [17, 23] which assume a bounded number of users and roles. A comparison with the result in [22] is more articulated. On the one hand, we are more general in allowing for a finite but unknown number of users and roles while in [22] the users are bounded and only the roles are parametric. On the other hand, we allow for only a restricted form of negation in the preconditions of certain administrative actions while [22] seems to allow for arbitrary negation. We plan to investigate how to extend our framework to allow for arbitrary negation in the near future while in this paper we focus on the core ideas. Finally, our procedure can consider several initial RBAC policies at the same time while [17, 23, 22] can handle only one.
Plan of the paper. In Section 2, we formally define ARBAC policies with their user-role reachability problem. In Section 3, we present our symbolic framework for the specification of ARBAC polices. In Section 4, we design a symbolic analysis procedures of ARBAC policies. In Section 5, we discuss some preliminary experiments with a prototype of our technique. Section 6 concludes and gives some hints about future work. The omitted proofs and some additional material can be found in the extended version of the paper [7] .
We assume familiarity with ARBAC (see, e.g., [11] ) and many-sorted first-order logic with equality (see, e.g., [13] ). Consider a signature Σ ARBAC containing the sort symbols User , Role, and Permission, countably many constant symbols e u i , e r i , e p i (for i ≥ 0) of sort User , Role, and Permission, respectively, the predicate symbols (written infix), pa, and ua of arity Role×Role, Role×Permission, and User ×Role, respectively, and no function symbols. A RBAC policy is a firstorder structure M = (D, I) over this signature, where the interpretation of ua (in symbols, ua I ) is the user-role assignment relation, pa I is the permission-role assignment, and I is the role hierarchy. Without loss of generality, we consider structures that interpret the sort symbols into (disjoint) sets of users, roles, and permissions, respectively. Our notion of state corresponds to that of miniRBAC policy in [23] .
An ARBAC policy prescribes how the user-role assignment, the permission assignment, and the role hierarchy of RBAC policies may evolve. As in [23] and according to the URA97 administrative control model [19] , in this paper, we assume that the interpretations of and pa are constant over time and only that of ua may change. We also assume that I is a partial order and refer to I as the 'more senior than' relationship between roles. We abuse notation by denoting an interpretation M = (D, I) over Σ ARBAC with the restriction s of I to ua when the rest of M is clear from the context and write , pa, and ua instead of I , pa I , and uas if there exists a user u a such that u a satisfies r a in s and s is obtained from s by its application if s (ua) = s(ua) \ {(u, r )}. If α is a can assign or a can revoke action, we write α(s, s ) to denote the fact that the action is enabled in s and s is obtained from s by applying α. The pair (S 0 , A) is an ARBAC policy when S 0 is a finite set of RBAC policies, called initial, and A is a finite set of can assign and can revoke actions. Let u be a user, RP be a finite set of pairs (r, p) where r is a role and p a permission. The pair γ := (u, RP ) is called the goal of the user-role reachability problem for Γ := (S 0 , A) which consists of answering the following question: is there a sequence s 0 , ..., s m of states such that s 0 ∈ S 0 , for each i = 0, ..., m − 1, there exists α ∈ A for which α(s i , s i+1 ), (u, r) ∈ s m (ua), and (r, p) ∈ pa for each pair (r, p) ∈ RP . If there is no such m ≥ 0, then the goal γ is unreachable; otherwise, it is reachable and the sequence s 0 , ..., s m of states is called a run leading Γ from an initial RBAC policy s 0 ∈ S 0 to a RBAC policy satisfying γ.
Example 1. We formalize the running example in [17] . Let M be an RBAC policy such that User := {Alice, Bob, Carol}, Permission := {Edit, Access, V iew}, and Role := {Employee, Engineer, P artT ime, F ullT ime, HumanResource, P rojectLead, andM anager}.
3 Every user is a member of role Employee. Managers work full-time. Project leaders are engineers. Alice is an engineer who is part-time. All employees have access permission to the office. Thus, M is also such that := {(Engineer, Employee), (P artT ime, Employee), (F ullT ime, Employee), (P rojectLead, Engineer), (M anager, F ullT ime)}, pa := {(Access, Employee), (V iew, HumanResource), (Edit, Engineer)}, ua := {(Alice, P art-T ime), (Alice, Engineer), (Bob, M anager), (Carol, HumanResource)}.
Examples of can assign are: M anager, {Engineer, F ullT ime}, P rojectLead , HumanResource, ∅, F ullT ime , and HumanResource, ∅, P artT ime . The meaning of the first action is that a manager can assign a full-time engineer to be a project leader; the second and the third ones mean that a user in the human-resources department can turn any user to be full-time or part-time. If we attach to the previous assignments, the singleton set T = {Carol} of users; then those actions cannot be performed by Carol even if she has the appropriate roles. Examples of can revoke actions are: M anager, P rojectLead , M anager, Engineer , HumanResource, F ullT ime , and HumanResource, P artT ime . For instance, the meaning of the first is that a manager can revoke the role of project leader to any user; the meaning of the other actions is similar.
Symbolic representation of ARBAC policies
Our framework represents (i) sets of RBAC policies as the models of a firstorder theory whose signature contains only constant and predicate symbols but no function symbols, (ii) initial RBAC policies and constraints as universal formulae, and goals of reachability problems as existential formulae, and (iii) administrative actions (such as the can assign and can revoke) as certain classes of formulae. The assumptions on the three components allow us to design a decision procedure for the user-role reachability problem where the number of users and roles is finite but unknown. We now describe in details these assumptions.
Formal preliminaries. A Σ-theory is a set of sentences (i.e. formulae where no free variables occur) over the signature Σ. A theory T is axiomatized by a set Ax of sentences if every sentence ϕ in T is a logical consequence of Ax. We associate with T the class M od(T ) of structures over Σ which are models of the sentences in T . A theory is consistent if M od(T ) = ∅. A Σ-formula ϕ is satisfiable modulo T iff there exists M ∈ M od(T ) such that M satisfies ϕ (in symbols, M |= ϕ). A Σ-formula ϕ is valid modulo T iff its negation is unsatisfiable modulo T and it is equivalent modulo T to a Σ-formula ϕ iff the formula (ϕ ⇔ ϕ ) is valid modulo T . As notational conventions, the variables u, r, p and their subscripted versions are of sort Users, Roles, and Permissions, respectively; u, r, p denote tuples of variables of sort Users, Roles, Permission, respectively; ϕ(x, π) denotes a quantifier-free formula where at most the variables in the tuple x may occur free and at most the predicate symbols in the tuple π may occur besides those of the signature over which ϕ is built. In this paper, we consider only consistent theories axiomatized by universal sentences of the form ∀x.ϕ(x). In the examples, we will make frequent use of the theory of scalar values v 1 , ..., v n (for n ≥ 1) of type S, denoted with SV ({v 1 , ..., v n }, S), whose signature consists of the sort S, the constant symbols v 1 , ..., v n of sort S, and it is axiomatized by the following (universal) sentences: v i = v j for i, j = 1, ..., n, i = j, and ∀x.(x = v 1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = v n ), where x is of sort S.
Symbolic representation of RBAC policies
Let T Role be a Σ Role -theory axiomatized by a finite set of universal sentences where Σ Role contains the sort Role, the predicate , and countably many constants of sort Role but no function symbol. Let T User be a Σ User -theory axiomatized by a finite set of universal sentences where Σ User contains the sort User , countably many constants of sort User but no function symbol. Let T Permission be a Σ Permission -theory axiomatized by a finite set of universal sentences where Σ Permission contains the sort Role and countably many constants of sort Permission but no function symbol. We emphasize that the signatures of these three theories may contain finitely many predicate symbols besides those mentioned above but no function symbols.
Example 2. For the version of ARBAC we are considering, the theory T Role can be axiomatized by the following three universal sentences: ∀r.(r r), ∀r 1 , r 2 .((r 1 r 2 ∧ r 2 r 1 ) ⇒ r 1 = r 2 ), and ∀r 1 , r 2 , r 3 .((r 1 r 2 ∧ r 2 r 3 ) ⇒ r 1 r 3 ). This means that is interpreted as a partial order by the structures in M od(T Role ). The set of basic roles and their positions in the partial order can be defined, when considering Example 1, as the following sentences: Engineer Employee, P artT ime Employee, F ullT ime Employee, P rojectLead Engineer, and M anager F ullT ime. The interested reader can see [7] for a discussion on how to formalize ARBAC with parametric roles.
For the theory T User , we have a similar flexibility. For example, if there is only a finite and known number n ≥ 1 of users, say e u 1 , ..., e u n , then we can use the theory of a scalar value SV ({e u 1 , ..., e u n }, User ). Another situation is when we have a finite but unknown number of users whose identifiers are, for example, linearly ordered (think of the integers with the usual order relation 'less than or equal'). In this case, we add the ordering relation ≤ of arity User × User to Σ User and the following universal sentences constrain ≤ to be a linear order:
. If T User = ∅, then the identifiers e u i of users can be compared for (dis-)equality and there is again a finite but unknown number of users.
Similar observations also hold for T Permission . Often, there is only a finite and known number of permissions that can be associated to roles. For example, continuing the formalization of Example 1, recall that we have only three permissions: Access, View, and Edit. So, T Permission := SV ({Access, V iew, Edit}, Permission).
As shown by the example above, the flexibility of our approach allows us to go beyond standard ARBAC policies by specifying the domains of users, roles, and permissions enjoying non-trivial algebraic properties which are useful to model, e.g., property-based policies [16] . We leave a detailed analysis of the scope of applicability of our framework to future work (as a first step in this direction, see [6] ). Now, we define Σ ARBAC := Σ Role ∪ Σ User ∪ Σ Permission ∪ {pa, ua} and let T ARBAC := T Role ∪ T User ∪ T Permission ∪ PA, where PA is a set of (universal) sentences over Σ Role ∪ Σ Permission ∪ {pa} characterizing the permission assignment relation.
Example 3. Consider again Example 1. The permission-role assignment is axiomatized by
Observe that a structure in M od(T ARBAC ) over Σ ARBAC is a RBAC policy.
Symbolic representation of initial RBAC policies, constraints, and goals
Since no axiom involving ua is in T ARBAC , the interpretation of ua is arbitrary. We consider the problem of how to constrain the interpretation of ua by means of an example.
Example 4. We specify the user-role assignment of Example 1. Let T User , T Role , and T Permission be as in Example 3. Consider the formula In(ua):
(Notice that In(ua) can be seen as the Clark's completion [10] of the facts: ua(Alice, P artT ime), ua(Alice, Engineer), ua(Bob, M anager), and ua(Carol, HumanResource).) It is easy to see that the interpretation considered in Example 1 satisfies In(ua).
Since the formula In(ua) used in the example above belongs to the class of universal sentences containing the state variable ua, we will use such a class of formulae, and denote it with ∀-formulae, to symbolically specify initial RBAC policies. Notice that ∀-formulae are not only useful to describe initial RBAC policies but also to express constraints on the set of states that can assign and can revoke actions must satisfy. As an example, consider RBAC policies with separation of duty constraints, i.e. a user cannot be assigned two given roles. This can be enforced by using static mutually exclusive roles (SMER) constraints that require pairs of roles with disjoint membership (see, e.g., [23] ). Formulae representing SMER constraints are ∀-formulae with the following form: ∀u.¬(ua(u, e r i ) ∧ ua(u, e r j )), for i, j ≥ 0 and i = j. Notice that other kinds of constraints can be specified in our framework as long as they can be expressed as ∀-formulae.
Example 6. Let us consider again the situation described in Example 1. One may be interested in knowing if user Alice can take role FullTime and have permission Access. This property can be encoded by the following formula:
Generalizing this example, we introduce ∃-formulae of the form ∃u, r, p.ϕ(u, r, p).
Symbolic representation of administrative actions
A policy literal is either ua(u, r), ¬ua(u, r), a literal over Σ User (e.g., u = e 
where k, i ≥ 0, C is a policy expression called the guard of the transition, primed variables denote the value of the state variable ua after the execution of the transition, ua (u, e r i ) abbreviates
and b is true when is ⊕ and it is false when is . 4 It is possible to symbolically represent can assign actions as formulae of the form (1) and can revoke actions as formulae of the form (2). We illustrate this with an example.
Example 7. We specify in our framework the administrative actions given in Example 1. The can assign action M anager, {Engineer, F ullT ime}, P rojectLead corresponds to the following instance of (1):
Two observations are in order. First, the literal u = Carol disables the transition when u is instantiated to Carol. This allows us to model the set T = {Carol} of users that are prevented to execute assignments. Second, by simple logical manipulations and recalling the definition of the abbreviation ua * introduced in Section 2, it is possible to rewrite the guard of the transition as ua * (u, M anager)∧ua * (u 1 , Engineer)∧ua * (u 1 , F ullT ime)∧u = Carol. The simpler can assign rules HumanResource, ∅, F ullT ime and HumanResource, ∅, P artT ime can be specified by the following two instances of (1):
Following [17] , we call AAT U (an abbreviation for 'assignment and trusted users') the set containing the above three formulae. The can revoke action M anager, P rojectLead is formalized by the following instance of (2): ∃u, r.(ua(u, r)∧r M anager ∧ ua = ua (u 1 , P rojectLead)). The remaining three can revokes can be obtained from the formula above by simply replacing Manager and ProjectLead with Manager and Engineer for M anager, Engineer , with HumanResource and FullTime for HumanResource, F ullT ime , and with HumanResource and PartTime for HumanResource, P artT ime .
Notice that the guards of the transitions of the form (1) do not correspond exactly to those introduced in Section 2. On the one hand, policy expressions give us the possibility to require a user u to be an explicit member of a certain role r in the guard of transition (by writing ua * (u, r)) while preconditions of a can assign can only require a user to be an implicit member of a role (i.e. ua * (u, r)). On the other hand, it is not possible, in general, to express ¬ua * (u, r) (i.e. u is neither an explicit nor an implicit member of r), although it is possible to use ¬ua(u, r) (i.e. u is not an explicit member of r). This is so because to express ¬ua * (u, r), a universal quantification is required; recall from Section 2 that ¬ua * (u, r) abbreviates ∀r .(r r ⇒ ¬ua(u, r)). In other words, only a limited form of negation can be expressed in the guards of our formalization of a can assign action. This simplifies the technical development that follows, in particular the proof of termination of the procedure used to solve the user-role reachability problem (see Section 4 for details). We plan to adapt a technique used in infinite state model checking for handling global conditions to allow ¬ua * (u, r) in the guards of transitions (see, e.g., [4] ) but leave this to future work. Here, we observe that in many situations of practical relevance, it is possible to overcome this difficulty. For example, when there are only finitely many roles ranging over a set R, it is possible to eliminate the hierarchy as explained in [21] so that the framework proposed in this paper applies without problems. It is worth noticing that although the set of roles has been assumed to be bounded, our framework supports the situation where the set of users can be finite but its cardinality is unknown.
Reachability and satisfiability modulo T ARBAC
At this point, it should be clear that the (algebraic) structures of users, roles, and permission can be specified by suitable theories; that we can symbolically represent RBAC policies and goals by using ∀-formulae and ∃-formulae, respectively, can assign actions by formulae of the form (1), and can revoke actions by formulae of the form (2). As a consequence, we can rephrase the user-goal reachability problem introduced in Section 2 as follows.
Let T ARBAC be a Σ ARBAC -theory given as described above and specifying the structure of users, roles, permission, role hierarchy, and the permission-role relation. If Γ := (S 0 , A) is an ARBAC policy together with a set C of constraints on the set of states that the actions of the system must satisfy (e.g., SMER), then derive the associated symbolic ARBAC policy Γ s := (In(ua), T r, C) as explained above, where In is a ∀-formula representing the initial set S 0 of RBAC policies, T r is a finite set of instances of (1) or of (2) corresponding to the actions in A, and C is a finite set of ∀-formula representing constraints in C. Furthermore, let γ s be an ∃-formula of the form
called a symbolic goal and corresponding to a goal RP := {(e r ji , e p ji ) | i = 1, ..., n}, where ∈ {=, }. Then, it is easy to see that the user-role reachability problem for Γ with RP as goal is solvable iff there exists a natural number ≥ 0 such that the formula
is satisfiable modulo T ARBAC , where τ is the disjunction of the formulae in T r, and ι is the disjunction of those in C. Notice that the (big) conjunction over with In in (4) can be seen as a characterization of the set of states (forward) reachable from the initial set of states. Symmetrically (and more interestingly for the rest of this paper), the (big) conjunction over with γ s in (4) characterizes the set of states backward reachable from the goal states. We observe that when = 0, no actions must be performed and already some of the states in In satisfies γ s , thus, formula (4) simplifies to In(ua 0 ) ∧ ι(ua 0 ) ∧ γ s (ua 0 ). Example 8. We illustrate the check for satisfiability of the formula (4) for = 0 by reconsidering the situation described in Example 6. The problem was to establish if the formula In(ua) of Example 4 and the goal formula of Example 6 are satisfiable modulo the theory T ARBAC in Example 3. We assume that the set of constraints of the symbolic ARBAC polices is empty. In this context, the formula (4) above can be written as follows:
where the existentially quantified variables in the goal have been renamed for clarity. The problem is to establish the satisfiability of P O modulo the theory T ARBAC in Example 3. As it will be seen below, there exists an algorithm capable of answering this question automatically. For P O, the algorithm would return 'unsatisfiable,' entitling us to conclude that the set of initial states considered in Example 4 do not satisfy the goal of allowing Alice, who is a full-time employee, to get access to a certain resource.
If we were able to automatically check the satisfiability of formulae of the form (4), an idea to solve the user-role reachability problem for ARBAC policies would be to generate instances of (4) for increasing values of . However, this would not give us a decision procedure for solving the goal reachability problem but only function BReach(Γ : (In, T r, C), γ : ∃-formula) 1 P ←− γ; B ←− false; τ ←− t∈T r t; ι ←− i∈C i; 2 while (ι ∧ P ∧ ¬B is satisfiable modulo TARBAC ) do 3 if (In ∧ P is satisfiable modulo TARBAC ) then return reachable; 4 B ←− P ∨ B; 5 P ←− P re(τ, P ); 6 end 7 return unreachable; Fig. 1 . The basic backward reachability procedure a semi-decision procedure. In fact, the method terminates only when the goal is reachable from the initial state, i.e. when, for a certain value of , the instance of the formula (4) is unsatisfiable modulo T ARBAC . When, instead, the goal is not reachable, the check will never detect the unsatisfiability and we will be forced to generate an infinite sequence of instances of (4) for increasing values of . In other words, the decidability of the satisfiability of (4) modulo T ARBAC is only a necessary condition for ensuring the decidability of the user-role reachability problem. Fortunately, is possible to stop enumerating instances of (4) for a certain value of when the formula characterizing the set of reachable states for = + 1 implies that characterizing the set of reachable states for = ; i.e. we have detected a fixed-point. We explore this idea in the following section.
Symbolic analysis of ARBAC policies
A general approach to solve the user-role reachability problem is based on computing the set of backward reachable states. It is well-known that the computation of sets of backward (rather than forward) reachable states is easier to mechanize. For n ≥ 0, the n-pre-image of a formula K(ua) is a formula P re n (τ, K) recursively defined as follows: P re 0 (τ, K) := K and P re n+1 (τ, K) := P re(τ, P re n (τ, K)), where
The formula P re n (τ, γ) describes the set of states from which it is possible to reach the goal γ in n ≥ 0 steps. At the n-th iteration of the loop, the backward reachability algorithm depicted in Figure 1 , stores the formula P re n (τ, γ) in the variable P and the formula BR n (τ, γ) := n i=0 P re i (τ, γ) (representing the set of states from which the goal γ is reachable in at most n steps) in the variable B. While computing BR n (τ, γ), BReach also checks whether the goal is reachable in n steps (cf. line 3, which can be read as In ∧ P re n (τ, γ) is satisfiable modulo T ARBAC ) or a fixed-point has been reached (cf. line 2, which can be read as ) ) is so and a fixed-point has been reached. The invariant ι is conjoined to the set of backward reachable states when performing the fixed-point check as only those states that also satisfies the constraints are required to be considered. When BReach returns unreachable (cf. line 7), the variable B stores the formula describing the set of states which are backward reachable from γ which is also a fixed-point. Otherwise, when it returns reachable (cf. line 3) at the n-th iteration, there exists a run of length n that leads the AR-BAC policy from a RBAC policy in In to one in γ. We observe that for BReach to be an effective (possibly non-terminating) procedure, it is mandatory that (i) the formulae used to describe the set of backward reachable states are closed under pre-image computation and (ii) both the satisfiability test for safety (line 3) and that for fixed-point (line 2) are effective.
Regarding (i), it is sufficient to prove the following result.
Property 1. Let K be an ∃-formula. If τ is of the form (1) or (2), then P re(τ, K) is equivalent (modulo T ARBAC ) to an effectively computable ∃-formula.
Proof. Let K(ua) := ∃ũ,r.γ(ũ,r, ua(ũ,r)), where γ is a quantifier-free formula. By definition, P re(τ, K) is ∃ua .(τ (ua, ua ) ∧ K(ua )) and there are two cases to consider. The former is when τ is of the form (1). In this case, ∃ua .(τ (ua, ua ) ∧ K(ua )) is equivalent to ∃u, r, u 1 , r 1 , r 2 , ..., r k . C(u, r, u 1 , r 1 , r 2 , ..., r k )∧ ∃ũ,r.γ(ũ,r, (ua ⊕ (u 1 , e r ))(ũ,r)) by simple logical manipulations and recalling the definition of K. In turn, this can be expanded to ∃u, r, u 1 , r 1 , r 2 , ..., r k .(C(u, r, u 1 , r 1 , r 2 , ..., r k )∧ ∃ũ,r.γ(ũ,r, (λw, r.(if (w = u ∧ r = e r ) then true else ua(w, r)))(ũ,r)))
by recalling the definition of ⊕. It is possible to eliminate the λ-expression by observing that each of its occurrence will be applied to a pair of existentially quantified variables fromũ,r so that β-reduction can be applied. After this phase, the 'if-then-else' expressions can be eliminated by using a simple caseanalysis followed by the moving out of the existential quantifiers that allows us to obtain an ∃-formula. This concludes the proof of this case. The second case, i.e. when τ is of the form (2), is omitted because almost identical to the previous.
Observe also that P re(
) for τ i of forms (1) and (2), for i = 1, ..., n.
Example 9. To illustrate Property 1, we consider one of the transitions written in Example 7 and the goal in Example 6. We compute the pre-image w.r.t. the second transition in AAT U (where HR
which, by case analysis and some simplification steps, can be rewritten to
which is an ∃-formula according to Property 1.
Concerning the decidability of the satisfiability tests for safety and fixed-point in the backward reachability algorithm in Figure 1 (point (ii) above), we observe that the formulae at lines 2 and 3 can be effectively transformed to formulae in the form ∃x∀y.ϕ(x, y, ua) where x and y are disjoint, which belong to the Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey (BSR) class (see, e.g., [18] ). To see how this is possible, let us consider the formulae at line 2. This is the conjunction of a ∀-formula (ι), an ∃-formula (as discussed above, the variable P stores P re n (τ, γ), which by Property 1 is an ∃-formula), and another ∀-formula (as discussed above, the variable B stores n i=0 P re i (τ, γ) whose negation is a conjunction of ∀-formulae by Property 1, which is a ∀-formula). By moving out quantifiers (which is always possible as quantified variables can be suitably renamed), it is straightforward to obtain a BSR formula. Now, let us turn our attention to the formula at line 3. It is obtained by conjoining a ∀-formula (In is so by assumption) and an ∃-formula (stored in the variable P , see previous case). Again, by simple logical manipulations, it is not difficult to obtain a formula in the BSR class. We also observe that checking the satisfiability of BSR formulae modulo T ARBAC can be reduced to checking the satisfiability of formulae in the BSR class since all the axioms of T ARBAC are universal sentences, i.e. BSR formulae. Collecting all these observations, we can state the following result.
Property 2. The satisfiability tests at lines 2 and 3 of the backward reachability procedure in Figure 1 are decidable.
This property is a corollary of the decidability of the satisfiability of the BSR class (see, e.g., [18] ). Example 9 above contains an illustration of a satisfiability test to which Property 2 applies.
Termination
The closure under pre-image computation (Property 1) and the decidability of the satisfiability checks (Property 2) guarantee the possibility to mechanize the backward reachability procedure in Figure 1 but do not eliminate the risk of non-termination. There are various sources of diverge. For example, the existential prefix of a pre-image is extended at each pre-image computation with new variables as shown in the proof of Property 1. Another potential problem is that the fixed-point could not be expressed by using disjunctions of ∃-formulae (according to line 4 in Figure 1 ) even if it exists so that the procedure is only able to compute approximations and thus never terminates. To show that both problems can be avoided and that the procedure in Figure 1 terminates, we follow the approach proposed in [14, 5] for proving the termination of backward reachability for certain classes of infinite state systems. We introduce a model-theoretic notion of certain sets of states, called configurations, which are the semantic counter-part of ∃-formulae, and then define a well-quasi-order on them: this, according to the results in [5] , implies the termination of the backward reachability procedure. For lack of space, the full technical development is omitted and can be found in [7] ; here, we only sketch the main ideas. We also point out that this result can be seen as a special case of that in [14] , developed in a more general framework that allows for the formalization and the analysis of safety properties for concurrent, distributed, and timed systems as well as algorithms manipulating arrays. However, we believe worthwhile to prove termination for the procedure presented in this paper (along the lines of [14] ) as some technical definitions become much simpler.
A state of the symbolic ARBAC policy Γ := (In, T r, C) is a structure M ∈ M od(T ARBAC ), i.e. it is an RBAC policy belonging to a certain class of firstorder structures. A configuration of Γ is a state M such that the cardinality of the domain of M is finite. Intuitively, a configuration is a finite representation of a possibly infinite set of states that "contains at least the part mentioned in the configuration." The following example can help to grasp the underlying intuition. The idea that a configuration represents a (possibly infinite) set of RBAC policies sharing a common (finite) set of user-role assignments can be made precise by using the notion of partial order. A pre-order (P, ≤) is the set P endowed with a reflexive and transitive relation. An upward closed set U of the preorder (P, ≤) is such that U ⊆ P and if p ∈ U and p ≤ q then q ∈ U . A cone is an upward closed set of the form ↑ p = {q ∈ P | p ≤ q}. We define a pre-order on configurations as follows. Let M and M be configurations of Γ ; M ≤ M iff there exists an embedding from M to M . Roughly, an embedding is a homomorphism that preserves and reflects relations (see [7] for a formal definition) . A configuration is the semantic counter-part of an ∃-formula. Let 
An upward closed set U is finitely generated iff it is a finite union of cones. A pre-order (P, ≤) is a well-quasi-ordering (wqo) iff every upward closed sets of P is finitely generated. This is equivalent to the standard definition of wqo, see [14] for a proof. The idea is to use only finitely generated upward closed sets as configurations so that their union is also finitely generated and we can conclude that the backward reachability procedure in Figure 1 is terminating because of the duality between configurations and ∃-formulae (Lemma 1).
Theorem 1. The backward reachability procedure in Figure 1 terminates.
As a corollary, we immediately obtain the following fact.
Theorem 2. The user-role reachability problem is decidable.
This result is more general that those in [17, 23] which assume a bounded number of users and roles. We are more general than [22] in allowing for a finite but unknown number of users and roles while in [22] the users are bounded and only the roles are parametric. However, we allow for only a restricted form of negation in the preconditions of can assign actions while [22] seems to allow for arbitrary negation. Moreover, our procedure can consider several initial RBAC policies at the same time while [17, 23, 22] can handle only one.
Finally, notice that we can reduce other analysis problems (e.g., role containment) to user-role reachability problems and thus show their decidability. For lack of space, this can be found in [7] .
Preliminary experiments
We briefly discuss some experiments with a prototype implementation of the symbolic reachability procedure in Figure 1 that we call ASSA, short for Automated Symbolic Security Analyser. We consider the synthetic benchmarks described in [23] and available on the web at [2] whereby both the number of users and roles is bounded. We perform a comparative analysis between ASSA and the state-of-the-art tool in [23] , called Stoller below. Our findings shows that ASSA scales better than Stoller on this set of benchmarks; the experiments were conducted on an Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU T5870, 2 GHz, 3 GB RAM, running Linux Debian 2.6.32.
A client-server architecture is the most obvious choice to implement the proposed symbolic backward reachability procedure. The client generates the sequence of formulae representing pre-images of the formula representing the goal. In addition, the client is also assumed to generate the formulae characterising the tests for fix-point or for non-empty intersection with the initial set of policies. The server performs the checks for satisfiability modulo T ARBAC and can be implemented by using state-of-the-art automated deduction systems such as automated theorem provers (in our case, SPASS [3]) or SMT solvers (in our case, Z3 [1]). Although these tools are quite powerful, preliminary experiments have shown that the formulae to be checked for satisfiability generated by the client quickly become very large and are not easily solved by available state-of-the-art tools. A closer look at the formulae reveals that they can be greatly simplified with substantial speed-ups in the performances of the reasoning systems. To this end, some heuristics have been implemented whose description is not possible here for lack of space; the interested reader is pointed to [6] for a complete description and more experiments.
We consider the randomly generated benchmarks in [2] , where only the userrole assignment relation ua can be modified by can assign or can revoke actions (as assumed in Section 2). These benchmarks were generated under two additional simplifying assumptions: (i) a fixed number of users and roles, and (ii) absence of role hierarchy (this is without loss of generality under assumption (i) as observed in [23] ). Besides the number of roles, one of the key parameter of the benchmarks (according to the parametrised complexity result derived in [23] ) is the goal size, i.e. the number of roles in the set RP of a goal reachability problem (as defined at the end of Section 2) or, equivalently, the number of constants of sort Role occurring in the symbolic goal (3) of Section 3.4. The benchmarks are divided in five classes. The first and the second classes were used to evaluate the worst-case behavior of forward search algorithms (i.e. when the goal is unreachable) described in [23] . Our backward procedure (almost) immediately detects unreachability by realizing that no action is backward applicable. The fourth and fifth classes of benchmarks fix the goal size to one while the values of other parameters (e.g., the cardinality of the set R of roles) grow. In particular, the fourth class was used to show that the cost of analysis grows very slowly as a function of the number of roles while the fifth aimed to compare the performances of an enhanced version of the forward and the backward algorithms of [23] . For both classes, ASSA confirms that its running time grows very slowly according to the results reported in [23] . However, ASSA is slightly slower than Stoller because of the overhead of invoking automated reasoning systems for checking for fix-points instead of the ad hoc techniques of [23] . The most interesting class of problems is the third, which was used to evaluate the scalability of the backward reachability algorithm of [23] with respect to increasing values of the goal size 1, 2, 3, and 4. Figure 2 shows four scatter plots for values 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the goal size: the X and Y axes report the median times of ASSA and Stoller, respectively (logarithmic scale), to solve the 32 reachability problems in the third class of the benchmarks. A dot above the diagonal means a better performance of ASSA and viceversa; the time out was set to 1, 800 sec. Although, both Stoller and ASSA were able to solve all the problems within the time-out, our tool is slower for goal sizes 1 and 2, behaves as Stoller for goal size 3, but outperforms this for goal size 4. These results are encouraging and seem to confirm the scalability of our techniques. For a detailed description of the implementation of ASSA and a more comprehensive experimental evaluation (confirming these results), the reader is pointed to [6] .
Discussion
We have proposed a symbolic framework for the automated analysis of ARBAC policies that allowed us to prove the decidability of the parametric reachability problem. We used a decidable fragment of first-order logic to represent the states and the actions of ARBAC policies to design a symbolic procedure to explore the (possibly infinite) state space. Preliminary results with a prototype tool implementing the backward reachability procedure in Figure 1 are encouraging.
A detailed description of the implementation of the prototype and an extensive experimental analysis is available in [6] .
There are two main directions for future work. First, it would be interesting to study to what extent other variants of ARBAC can be formalized in our framework, e.g., for UARBAC [16] . Second, we want to adapt techniques developed in the context of infinite state model checking to eliminate universal quantifiers in guards of administrative actions (called global conditions, see, e.g., [4] ), to allow for unrestricted negation in can assigns.
Plan of the Appendixes
We provide some additional material to illustrate and integrate the results presented in the paper:
-Appendix A discusses how to formalize parametric roles in our framework and explain that the decidability result for user-role reachability also cover this scenario. -Appendix B presents the formal details of the termination of the backward reachability procedure in Figure 1 . -Appendix C discusses three related security analysis problems for ARBAC polices (namely, inductive policy invariant, role containment, and weakest preconditions) and their relationship with the user-role reachability problem. -Finally, Appendix D describes in some detail an execution of the symbolic backward reachability procedure Figure 1 on a simple example taken from [23] .
A Formalizing parametric roles
Here, we explain how it is possible to model ARBAC policies with parametrised roles as considered in, e.g., [22] . A role schema can be seen as an expression of the form ρ(p 1 , ..., p n ) for n ≥ 0, where ρ is a role name and p i is a distinct parameter name i = 1, ..., n. Each parameter can take values from a given data type containing an infinite number of values. An instance of a role schema is an expression of the form ρ(p 1 = t 1 , ..., p n = t n ), where t i is a data value or a variable. For example, in the university policy considered in [22] , the role schema Student(dept, cid) is used for students registered for the course numbered cid offered by department dept, the role schema Student(dept) is used for all students of a specific department dept, and the instance Student(dept = cs, cid = 101) identifies students of the Computer Science department taking course 101. Role schemas can be overloaded by using parameter names; e.g., Student can have one parameter named dept or two parameters named dept and cid. A parametrised version of ARBAC policies can use parametric roles to express role assignment and revocation in a very compact way. For example, in the case of the university policy, one can have the following role schemas: Chair (dept), Student(dept, cid), and TA(dept, cid). Then, a can assign rule is the following: the chair of department D (i.e. a user belonging to the role Chair (dept = D)) can assign a student of a department D taking course cs (i.e. a user belonging to the role Student(dept = D, cid = CID)) to be the teaching assistant of that course (i.e. a user belonging to the role TA(dept = D, cid = CID)).
In our symbolic framework, this situation can be formalized as follows. We introduce a predicate symbol extended with an extra argument for each parametric role, i.e. if the number of role names in the role schema ρ is n, then we use a predicate symbol ρ of arity n + 1 (this technique is standard for example to translate Entity-Relationship diagram schemas to fragments of first-order logic). For the example above, we introduce the following predicate symbols: Chair , Student, and TA of arity 2, 3, and 3, respectively. We do not use parameter names, instead we fix an order on them so that we can use the standard way of building atoms in first-order logic. When a role schema is overloaded, we introduce a different predicate symbol in order to disambiguate the situation; a simple automated pre-processing phase can be used to eliminate overloading. In this context, the 'can assign rule above can be written as follows:
where the variables r, r 1 , and r 2 are used as the names of the roles corresponding to the particular value of the attributes in the role schema. This means that we need to require that each relation is functional or, equivalently, that the interpretation of the predicate symbols must be partial functions. In our framework, this can be done by adding suitable formulae to the background theory T ARBAC . For the example of the university policy considered above, we can simply write the following two ∀-formulae:
Notice also that we can specify additional constraints among two or more relations if we can express them as ∀-formulae. It is not obvious how this feature can be added to the approach in [22] . For the example above, we have mentioned that we can have a role schema Student(dept) for identifying all students in the department dept. Indeed, Student(dept, cid) must characterize sub-sets of users of the role Student(dept). If we introduce a binary predicate symbol Student 1 of arity 2 corresponding to the role schema Student(dept), then we can express this by the following ∀-formula:
which can be added to T ARBAC .
To summarize, our framework can handle parametrised roles as follows. First, the sub-theory T Role of T ARBAC becomes many-sorted: besides the sort Role, we introduce as many sort symbols-called parameter sorts-as domains for the parameters of each role. Furthermore, for each role symbol ρ of arity n, we introduce a predicate symbol of arity n + 1. Overloading is eliminated by introducing decorated versions of the predicate symbol and an order on the parameter names is fixed so that we can use the standard way of building atoms of first-order logic. Second, for each predicate symbol ρ of arity n + 1, we add the following functional constraint to T Role and hence to T ARBAC : ∀x, r 1 , r 2 .((ρ(x, r 1 ) ∧ ρ(x, r 2 )) ⇒ r 1 = r 2 ), where x is a tuple of length n of variables of appropriate sorts. If needed, we can add further constraints, (e.g., formalizing relationship between different role symbols) if these can be expressed as ∀-formulae. For example, it is worth noticing how to express the role hierarchy for parametrised role. Besides the usual axioms requiring to be a partial order, we can add also ∀-formulae of the following form:
∀x, y, r 1 , r 2 .((ρ 1 (x, r 1 ) ∧ ρ 2 (y, r 2 )) ⇒ r 1 r 2 ), where x, y are tuples of variables of appropriate sorts, ρ 1 , ρ 2 are two predicates representing parametric roles. This axiom requires that all instances of the parametric role ρ 1 are senior than those of role ρ 2 . Notice that one can design more sophisticated hierarchical relationships between role instances depending on the values of the parameters, provided that the signature is rich enough to express the constraints between the values of the parameters and that only ∀-formulae are used.
Finally, can assign and can revoke actions can be written by using existentially quantified variables ranging over the parameter names besides those ranging over users and roles; thus generalizing the shapes of actions (1) and (2). Formally, transitions have the following forms:
where p is a tuple of variables of parameter sorts and C is a constraint in which also literals built out of the predicate symbols introduced for modelling parametric roles may occur.
All the results proved in Sections 4 and 4 can be easily extended to cover ARBAC policies with parametric roles as soon as we observe that the formulae introduced here satisfy the assumptions on the theory T ARBAC of Section 3.
B Termination of backward reachability
B.1 Pre-and well-quasi-orders: definitions and basic properties A pre-order (P, ≤) is the set P endowed with a reflexive and transitive relation. We say that ≤ is decidable if, given p 1 and p 2 in P , we can algorithmically check whether p 1 ≤ p 2 . An upward closed set U of the pre-order (P, ≤) is such that U ⊆ P and if p ∈ U and p ≤ q then q ∈ U . A cone is an upward closed set of the form ↑ p = {q ∈ P | p ≤ q}. An upward closed set U is finitely generated iff it is a finite union of cones.
For an upward closed set U , a generator of U is a set G such that (a) U = g∈G ↑ g and (b) g 1 ≤ g 2 implies g 1 = g 2 , for every g 1 , g 2 ∈ G. It is easy to see that G contains only minimal elements (w.r.t. ≤) but, in general, it needs not to be unique. In any case, it is always possible to define a function gen(U ) returning a unique generator of U (the same chosen among the many possible ones).
A pre-order (P, ≤) is a well-quasi-ordering (wqo) iff every upward closed sets of P is finitely generated (this is equivalent to the standard definition of wqo, see [14] for a proof). In the case of a wqo, gen(U ) is finite because of property (b) of the definition of generator of U . This implies that every upward closed set U can be characterized by a finite set of configurations, namely gen(U ).
B.2 Some notions and results of model-theory
Let M be a Σ-structure. A substructure of M is a Σ-structure N whose domain is contained in that of M and such that the interpretations of the symbols of Σ in N are restrictions of the interpretation of these symbols in M; conversely, we say that M is a superstructure of N . Let C be a class of structures; we say that C is closed under substructures if M ∈ C and N is a substructure of M, then N ∈ C.
Property 3. A class C of structures is closed under substructures iff there exists a theory T such that T contains only ∀-formulae and M od(T ) = C.
A proof of this result can be found in any book on model theory, e.g., [15] .
Let M and N two structures over the same signature Σ and M, N be their domains, respectively; an embedding s is an injective mapping from M to N such that (i) s(f M (e 1 , ...., e n )) = f N (s(e 1 ), ..., s(e n )) for each function symbol f in the signature Σ and (ii) (e 1 , ..., e n ) ∈ R M iff (s(e 1 ), ..., s(e m )) ∈ N for each predicate symbol R in Σ, where (e 1 , ..., e n ) is a tuple of elements in M of length equal to the arity of f or R, respectively. In other words, an embedding is a homomorphism that preserves and reflects relations. It is possible to show (see, e.g., [15] ) that any embedding can be seen as the composition of an isomorphism followed by an "extension," i.e. if there is an embedding from M to N , we can assume that M is a substructure of N (or dually, N is a superstructure of M).
Abstractly, (Robinson) diagrams give a logical formulation of model theoretic properties such as "there exists an embedding from structure M to structure N ." The importance of this will be clear when considering the definition of the pre-order on configurations (given in terms of the existence of an embedding between structures). Let M be a Σ-structure and A be a sub-set of the domain of M; Σ(A) is the signature obtained by adding to Σ new symbols of constants a for a ∈ A. We can regard M as a Σ(A)-structure when the interpretation function of M is extended so that every element a in A is mapped to the constant a.
Lemma 2 (Diagram Lemma). Let M and N be two Σ-structures and M be the domain of M. Then, there exists an embedding from M to N iff N can be expanded to a Σ(M )-structure which is a model of δ M (M ).
The proof of this fact is an immediate consequence of the definition of Robinson diagram given above and can be found in any book on model theory (see, e.g., [15] ).
B.3 A pre-order on configurations: formal definition
Let Γ be a symbolic ARBAC policy, i.e.
Γ := (In(ua), {τ 1 (ua, ua ) , ..., τ n (ua, ua )}, {ι 1 (ua), ..., ι m (ua)})
where In is a ∀-formula, ι j is a ∀-formula, and τ i is a transition formula of the forms (1) and (2).
Recall that a state of the ARBAC policy Γ is a structure M ∈ M od(T ARBAC ).
Definition 1. A configuration of Γ is a state M where M is a finite model, i.e. the cardinality of the domain of M is bounded.
We are now in the position to define the pre-order on configurations. Proof. Since the union of an upward closed set is still an upward closed set, we assume-without loss of generality-that K(ua) is of the form ∃r, u.ϕ(r, u, ua) where u, r are tuples of variables for users and roles, respectively, and ϕ is a conjunction of literals (as we can always transform a Boolean combination of atoms into disjunctive normal form and then distribute the existential quantifiers over the disjunction We show that entailment between ∃-formulae is equivalent to containment among configurations.
where ua has been dropped since the equality ua = λw, r.(· · ·) is easily seen to be always satisfiable (this is so because to make the equality true, it is sufficient to take ua equal to the λ-expression on the right) . Finally, simple considerations on the quantified variables allow us to simplify the last formula even further so as to obtain: ∃u, r.(ua(u, r) ∧ u = e u ∧ r = e r 5 ), whose matrix is a policy constraint, exactly as the matrix of γ. This is not an accident as it is possible to show that that the class of existentially quantified formulae whose matrix is a policy constraint are closed under pre-image computation. Let B 0 be γ and B 1 be the last formula above. The backward procedure performs a satisfiability check of the conjunction between In and B 1 , i.e. of the following formula: , wherer andũ are fresh constants. Now, observe that the universally quantified variable u can only take one value as we have assumed that the set of users contains just one element e u ; hence it must beũ = e u . So, we are left with the problem of instantiating the universally quantified variable r. The decidability result of Property 2 allows us to consider only the instances of the formula where u is instantiated to e u and r tor. It is not difficult to see that the resulting formula is unsatisfiable, thus entitling us to conclude that the sets of states characterized by B 1 and In are disjoint and the goal state is not reachable by applying can assign 4 .
Then, the backward procedure proceeds to check for a fix-point. This is equivalent to the validity of B 1 ⇒ B 0 or to the unsatisfiability of its negation, namely B 1 ∧ ¬B 0 : ∃u, r. ua(u, r) ∧ u = e u ∧ r = e r 5
∧ ∀u, r.¬(ua(u, r) ∧ u = e u ∧ r = e r 6 ).
As before, we Skolemize the existentially quantified variables so as to obtain the following formula:
ua(ũ,r) ∧ u = e u ∧r = e r 5
whereũ,r are fresh constants. As before, because of Property 2, without loss of generality, we can restrict to consider the formula obtained by instantiating u to e u and r tor: this time, however, we conclude that the formula is satisfiable. Thus, we have shown that a fix-point has not been reached and we need to compute the pre-images of B 1 w.r.t. the all the can assign and can revoke actions. However, before computing the pre-images of B 1 , we also need to compute the pre-images of B 0 w.r.t. τ in {can assign i |i = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6} ∪ {can revoke i |i = 1, .., 6}, i.e. for the remaining assignments and revocations. This turns out to be useless as all the formulae obtained in this way characterizes sets of states that are sub-sets of those specified by γ or, in other words, we have reached a (local) fix-point. For the sake of conciseness, we do not do this here. However, the reader can verify this as a simple exercise by following the steps taken above for computing P re(can assign 4 , U ) and checking for safety and fix-point. Similar observations hold also for the pre-images of B 1 : it turns out that all these formulae implies B 1 , i.e. several (local) fix-point have been reached, and are unsatisfiable when considered in conjunction with In, i.e. they pass the safety check. As a consequence, we can conclude that we have reached a (global) fix-point and the goal is not reachable.
